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CFO Sales Advisory December 14, 2009

The Case Against “Captain Ahab” Bonuses – Spotting The Great White Whale (i know)

In most cases, I am against binary incentive compensation schemes.  By this I mean any plan where achieving a single, specific milestone has a large cash payment tied to it.  I call these schemes “Captain Ahab” bonuses, in memory of the gold doubloon the Moby Dick character nailed to the mast, to be given to the first sailor to spot the great white whale.  The commonest example of these schemes is a cash bonus paid when the sales rep reaches exactly 100% of quota. 

My view is controversial, because we live in a culture of setting specific, measurable goals and then striving mightily to achieve them.  It seems only natural to attach great significance to achieving such goals.  But binary incentive schemes are a bad idea for several reasons. 

1.  Not many are really motivated by them.  The ideal comp plan doesn’t just reward the right behavior, but motivates it in the first place.  Ask yourself if a large bonus for reaching 100% of quota will actually motivate in these sales rep situations: 

  • The big producer, for whom achieving 100% is not the issue.  Not likely – this person is probably shooting for 200%, or 300%, or more. 
  • The sales rep whose year is in the dumper, regardless.  Not likely – especially late in the year, it may be more rational for this person to start next year with a clean slate, with one or two deals already in the bag. 
  • The sales rep already at 101% (or more) of quota.  Certainly not – a bonus check that’s already been written won’t motivate anyone to close another deal or two. 
  • The sales rep extremely close to quota – say, 99.5% – early in the year.  Not likely – most reps aren’t worried about eventually generating that extra 0.5%. 
  • The sales rep at 99.5%, late in the year.  Hmmm.  What might a rep consider doing to generate another $2,000-$3,000 in business in order to get a $20,000 bonus?  The term some would use for this situation is “moral hazard.”

2.  They use up oxygen.  The commission budget is finite, and you can use all of it for straight commissions, or set some aside for the Captain Ahab bonuses.  In the example below, 10 sales reps each have target incentive pay of $100,000 for achieving quota of $1 million.  Scheme A below is straight commissions only, and Scheme B includes a $20,000 bonus for achieving quota: 

Incentive Compensation Budget            Scheme A            Scheme B

Total quotas                                               $ 10,000,000         $ 10,000,000

Commissions                                                $ 1,000,000              $ 800,000

   (average commission rate)                         (10.0%)                    (8.0%)

100% Achievement Bonus                                      $ 0              $ 200,000

Total budgeted incentive compensation $ 1,000,000         $ 1,000,000

In both schemes, the total incentive compensation is the same if every rep is at 100% of quota.  However, if you accept the premise of Point (1) above – that the 100% achievement bonus does little or nothing to motivate most reps, most of the time – then Scheme B has no extra motivational effect.  Unfortunately, at the same time Scheme B reduces the commission rate by 20% compared to Scheme A (8% vs. 10%) – and that’s a difference every rep sees, every time he or she is looking at one more deal opportunity. 

3.  Who cares, really?  The notion that individual sales reps each should achieve quota has a logical flaw:  It’s a great feeling to have the engine firing on all cylinders, but isn’t the company’s objective simply to achieve the total revenue commitment it made to its stockholders?  Does it really matter which sales reps brought in that last couple of deals that got the company over the hump? 

In a future post, I’ll talk about situations where binary incentive schemes can make sense, and how to implement them.  But most of the time, while they may look good in theory, in practice they have little or no motivational value, and dilute the impact of incentive schemes that actually do motivate. 

 

CFO Sales Advisory November 9, 2009

Using Tropical Fish Charts to Manage Visibility

At the highest level, there are three main metrics in a sales forecasting system:  (1) total pipeline, (2) expected sales in the period (usually calculated as the sum of all pipeline deals, weighted by close probability), and (3) business closed so far.  For reasons that I think this audience understands, all three are critical to track, each for different reasons.  Even more valuable is comparing where you are in the current quarter to where you were at the same point in the last two or three quarters. 

While the information in a sales forecasting system captures critical information, virtually everything in the system is just a guess:  the size of each deal, when it might close, how likely it is to close, etc.  For that reason, the main value of a forecasting system is not to predict future results with scientific precision, but to help impose a uniform discipline on the sales process and to give management a sense of overall trends.  This makes a sales forecasting system an ideal candidate for presenting its key information in charts, rather than tables.  Here’s an example, recapping the weekly progress of the above three metrics for each quarter, through week 35 of the year: 

Here’s how to read this chart, which I call the “tropical fish chart” because of the visual impression I get from it: 

  1. The broken lines are the total pipeline, the solid lines arethe weighted average/expected outcome, and the dotted lines are business closed quarter to-date. 
  2. The Q1 forecasts are in blue, Q2 in red, and Q3 in green.  This company’sstandard practice is to begin tracking forecast progress for each quarter at the beginning of the prior quarter. 
  3. There are solid vertical gridlines demarcating each quarter-end (weeks 13 and 26, so far).  On the last day of the quarter (OK, in the last minute of the quarter!), the three curves for that quarter should converge at the quarter’s actual result, shown as a small square in that quarter’s color.  [Note that I’ve included a green square for Q3, which is the target for the quarter.] 
  4. I’ve included a thinner, broken vertical line at the current week (week 35, or 9 weeks into Q3) and also at the same point in the two prior quarters (i.e., weeks 9 and 22). 
  5. In most organizations, the total pipeline curve peaks at an amount much larger than the eventual result for that quarter, and the closed business curve increases monotonically starting in the first week of that quarter.  The weighted average curve’s behavior is harder to predict, since it’s driven by both the total size of the pipeline and the rate of progress toward closing deals throughout the quarter. 

I like this chart because it provides an at-a-glance perspective on how sales are progressing through the quarter, and whether things are on track for achieving target results.  Here are a few observations you could make from the sample chart shown above: 

  • The total pipeline for Q3 is light compared to where we were at the same point in the two previous quarters, especially considering that the Q3 target is significantly higher than the Q1 and Q2 results. 
  • The weighted average number seems to be roughly on track toward achieving the target result, in spite of the relatively smaller total pipeline – perhaps this is because the fewer deals this quarter are making better progress toward eventual closing. 
  • Closed business is much stronger at this point in the quarter than at the same point in Q1 and Q2.  This supports the argument that we are making better progress on the fewer total deals in the pipeline.  [And may generate a thank-you note from the manufacturing department!] 

As I’ve said here and in previous posts, sales forecasting systems are not a good place to look for “truth” in the sense that we usually think of that word with respect to numbers.  The main purpose of these systems is, after all, to predict the future, and that’s always messy.  But summarizing the information from the sales forecasting system in a coherent, consistent way is a powerful management tool for understanding how well the sales organization is functioning. 

CFO Sales Advisory October 18, 2009

Deal Close Probabilities:  SWAG vs. Zero Latitude

One of any sales forecasting system’s critical tasks is estimating just how much business the sales organization will actually close.  That is, you’re trying to boil that (hopefully) giant pile of suspects and prospects down to a single, critical number.  By far the most widely-used method for doing this is to assign a close probability to each deal, and the total forecast is then the sum of each deal’s size, times its close probability.  But how should you assign a probability to each deal?  You have two basic choices: 

  1. Sales management uses its best judgment to assign a probability to each deal. 
  2. The forecasting system assigns a probability to each deal, based on which of a series of predefined stages that deal is at in the sales cycle.  (e.g., face-to-face meeting = 15%, delivered proposal = 35%, in contract negotiations = 90%, etc.)

Many argue that Method 1 (management judgment) is the more “precise,” since we all know sales is a complex, subjective process.  Some “bluebirds” that arrive over the transom at the last minute do close, while some in the final stages of a months-long campaign don’t.  That observation is especially true since the object of all this computation is to estimate how much business will close in a given period

Even so, my strong recommendation is to use Method 2 (the system assigns the probabilities), for the following reasons: 

  • Motivating behavior.  Under Method 2, sales people know that the only way to make a deal seem nearer to closing is to complete a specific action (like having a meeting, delivering a proposal, getting something in writing from the customer, etc.). 
  • Reliability.  It’s asking a lot to require every sales manager to review and update the close probability of every deal in his or her territory every time you run the forecast.  Is this really how you want managers to be spending their time? 
  • Consistency.  Personality, style, and even cultural differences among sales managers may cause variations in how different managers will assess exactly the same deal. 
  • Personal agendas.  One of the risks of Method 1 is that managers may alter probabilities to attract or deflect corporate attention, or simply to get the calculated territory forecast closer to the manager’s gut feel number.  (Note that this is not always conscious behavior!)
  • Relevance.  Does all this really matter?  Remember that the object of a sales forecasting system is to provide a consistent view of sales organization progress from period to period, and to motivate effective sales management.  These are not quite the same as demanding that the weighted forecast halfway through the period exactly matches the eventual actual result. 

I suggest that Method 1 is the better approach only if (a) your company typically has a relatively small number of relatively large deals in your pipeline, (b) sales managers typically get personally involved in the close process, and (c) the ways deals get closed in your company are so diverse that a standardized view of deal stages just doesn’t make much sense anyway. 

In my last post, I observed that trying to improve systems and processes sometimes causes us to forget that “better is the enemy of good.”  Inputting close probabilities into a sales forecasting system is not only an example of that dynamic, but also shows that moderate precision that serves a real purpose is better than extreme precision that’s pointless

 

 

CFO Sales Advisory October 1, 2009

Forecasting Systems:  “Improvements” Can Make Them Useless

A useful and effective sales forecasting system is one of the Holy Grails of sales management.  The components of such a beast will be topics of this post from time to time.  But before we address any of those components in detail, I offer this fundamental truth about forecasting systems:  A mediocre system that’s used consistently is better than a perfect system that isn’t.

As profound as that statement may seem, it’s even deeper than that!  Obviously, no forecasting system is credible unless every rep and manager whose input is required (the “users”) inputs reliably and consistently.  What’s less obvious is this:  Changes to the system, especially efforts to “improve” the system, can themselves have a significant impact on how reliably and consistently the system gets used.  What if the changes you are considering will: 

  • Make inputting more time-consuming?  Virtually all significant changes to the system processes require the users to spend more time inputting data.  It’s a slippery slope:  the basic system just asks for prospect name and deal size, the next iteration asks for sales cycle stage, then product line detail, then activity summaries, and so on and so forth. 
  • Make inputting more complex?  What if, for example, the proposed changes will require users to specify which of seven, rather than three, stages in the sales cycle each prospect is at?  Or the changes mean inputting detailed product line information? 
  • Require more judgment and subjectivity?  For example, one approach to assigning probability of close is to tie a single specific probability to each stage (e.g., 100% for “closed,” 90% for “in contract negotiation,” 75% for “user signed off,” etc.).  Another approach requires a sales manager to input his or her own probability assessment for each deal.  Which approach produces the more reliable weighted average forecast? 
  • Generate unwanted visibility?  Additional detail in the system on each prospect is a two-edged sword.  On the plus side, it enables company-wide collaboration to help close a deal, and provides valuable information.  But from the sales force’s perspective, that extra support may feel more like meddling, and an opportunity to be micromanaged. 
  • Benefit those other than the system’s users?  For example, detailed product line information on all prospects might be much more valuable to marketing or engineering, than to the users who are just trying to close deals. 

Some of the consequences of these “improvements” can include:

  • Input errors because the users just can’t (or won’t) devote sufficient time to inputting correctly,
  • Input errors because the input procedures are more complicated,
  • Inconsistent data in the system resulting from individual judgment and cultural differences,
  • Data simply not entered, because users are concerned that (a) others will meddle, or (b) that they won’t personally benefit, through increased sales, from the significant additional effort that’s being asked of them. 

There’s no question that a good sales forecasting system is a living, breathing animal that is constantly evolving.  But every time you consider enhancing the system with the objective of getting more accurate, more reliable forecasts, you need to ask yourself:  When does “better” become the enemy of “good”? 

CFO Sales Advisory August 24, 2009

The “New Rep Ramp-Up”:  Don’t Let It Bite You! 

It takes new sales reps one to four quarters before they start to perform at full speed.  That’s especially true in businesses that depend on “elephant hunting,” where the bulk of the company’s revenues come from a relatively small number of big deals.  Those big deals take a long time to close, and depend on trusted relationship that take months or even years to build.  Understanding this dynamic in a practical and realistic way can save sales executives and their companies from embarrassment and planning fiascos that are virtually impossible to recover from.  

The key to planning properly for the “New Rep Ramp-Up Effect” is a quantified, realistic assessment of what a new rep can actually accomplish in his/her first few quarters.  Suppose, for example, that a reasonable expectation for new reps at XYZ Corp. is zero in their first quarter on the job, 50% of full production in the second, and then full production thereafter.  Let’s further assume that the annual quota for an up-to-speed sales rep is $1,000,000, or $250,000 per quarter.  If XYZ Corp. has 6 reps on board and fully up-to-speed at the beginning of 2010, with plans to hire 5 more during the year, here’s a realistic assessment of what the sales force can produce: 

XYZ Corp. – Sales Rep Quotas for 2010 (in $000)

 

Hire

Q1 ‘10

Q2 ‘10

Q3 ‘10

Q4 ‘10

TOT ‘10

Abel

 

250

250

250

250

1,000

Baker

 

250

250

250

250

1,000

Charlie

 

250

250

250

250

1,000

Delta

 

250

250

250

250

1,000

Echo

 

250

250

250

250

1,000

Foxtrot

 

250

250

250

250

1,000

New #1

Q1

0

250

250

250

750

New #2

Q1

0

250

250

250

750

New #3

Q2

0

0

250

250

500

New #4

Q3

n/a

n/a

0

250

250

New #5

Q4

n/a

n/a

n/a

0

0

TOTAL

 

1,500

2,000

2,250

2,500

8,250

 Just because there will be 11 full-time sales reps on board by the end of 2010 is a terrible reason to commit to a corporate plan of $11MM.  The above table suggests that a much more reasonable expectation for the year is $8.25MM.  And the situation is even riskier than that:  if some of the sales reps take longer to hire than expected, or – even worse – one of the new hires doesn’t work out and XYZ Corp. needs to find a replacement, that’s yet another hit to the company’s ability to make its number.  If XYZ Corp. was hoping to set a 2010 plan of, say, $10MM in revenues, they have two choices:  (a) increase the hiring plan to generate the additional revenue, and do it soon enough in the year that the additional hires can be productive during 2010; or (b) revise the $10MM plan downward. 

I have two principal recommendations for companies staring this “sales rep ramp-up effect” in the face, especially companies that are depending on as-yet-unhired sales people to contribute significantly: 

  1. Sales and financial management should work together to develop a clear, comprehensible model of new sales rep production, so everyone is on the same page. 
  2. In my last post on this Website, I advocated over-assigning quotas at every management level in the sales organization, to give everyone some breathing room on the plan numbers.  The risk surrounding the “sales rep ramp-up effect” is a great example of the kind of dynamic that makes over-assigning quotas a wise thing to do. 

 

CFO Sales Advisory August 9, 2009

Over-Assigning Quotas:  A Power to Be Used for Good, Not for Evil

I'm wearing my heart on my sleeve: I am a big fan of the practice of over-assigning sales quotas as part of a company’s annual planning process.  It’s a practice that provides reasonable breathing room for people at all levels in the company, and protects sales management from its own aggressiveness and over-optimism. 

To refresh everyone’s memory,” over-assigning quotas” means this:  At a given level in the sales organization, the sum of the sales quotas of the sales reps (or managers) at that level is greater than the sum of the quotas of the sales manager(s) one level up.  In larger companies, using the practice at multiple levels of sales management means that the difference between the sum of the quotas of the individual contributor sales reps and the corporate sales target can provide a pretty large cushion. 

As someone who has spent many years in the CFO’s chair, I like the practice because life tends to deal out more unpleasant surprises than pleasant ones.  Yes, every so often somebody hits the jackpot, but let’s face it:  there’s a reason why casinos are so profitable.  And over-assigned quotas provide a win/win situation for people throughout the organization: 

  • Senior management and the board appreciate the increased certainty that the company will achieve its top-level goals, which may be well worth the cost of a few extra sales reps. 
  • Sales managers appreciate the cushion in case new-hire sales reps don’t ramp up to full speed as quickly as hoped, or if unplanned turnover requires hiring new sales reps, who usually start at the bottom of the learning curve. 
  • Sales reps, not to mention the finance staff, appreciate the fact that the cushion reduces the pressure to perform “unnatural acts” – like granting excessive discounts, or calling in favors, or worse – in specific customer situations. 

But I conclude with a warning:  Don’t ever create an over-assigned situation simply by raising the quotas at lower levels in the organization.  That just doesn’t work.  It’s destructive to morale and trust – when you ask people to do more work for the same amount of pay, they feel like they’ve gotten a pay cut.  And if you “fix” that perception by also raising the target commissions at 100% of quota, you’ve lost some of the savings from keeping sales headcount down. 

Moreover, it’s just not realistic to think that you can get a seasoned sales and sales management team to sell more just by telling them to sell more.  Generally, that only works if the quotas were too low to begin with, and if that was the case, you have a different management problem. 

 

CFO Sales Advisory July 15, 2009

Projecting Commission Expense w/Accelerated Plans – the “Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs Effect”

As we discussed in a previous post, accelerated commission plans are a powerful motivational and management tool.  But if you don’t plan for them properly, you can have some ugly surprises when it’s time to write the checks or to explain your results to your investors. 

We’re referring to what is sometimes called the “Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs effect.”  Consider the accelerated plan we described earlier, in a company with five sales reps and a corporate revenue target of $5,000,000, where each rep has the same quota and target commission.  Here’s how those five reps might do under one scenario: 

                                 Production       Commission

            Fred                 $ 3,000,000            $ 500,000

            Mary                      750,000                 68,000

            Howard                 600,000                  48,000

            Louise                   500,000                  37,000

            Martin                   150,000                    9,000

            TOTAL             $ 5,000,000              $ 662,000

The good news is that as a whole, the company did fine, hitting their $5,000,000 target right on the nose.  But instead of having five reps each earning $100,000 (what reps earn at exactly 100% of the $1,000,000 individual quota) for a total commission payout of $500,000, the total bill for commissions comes to a hefty $662,000.  That’s $162,000, or more than 3% of revenues, above what it would be given level performance by each rep. 

Is this a problem?  It shouldn’t be:  you should never have expected performance to be evenly distributed across an entire sales force – that just doesn’t happen in real life, especially in businesses where big deals are typical.  This is a budgeting problem, not a sales management or a cost control problem.  But even so, a large unfavorable commission expense variance when sales were right at expectations is pretty embarrassing. 

To avoid this problem, it’s critical that sales and finance work together to estimate what the average sales rep will earn if the company achieves its plan.  A key part of that is estimating the probable mix between “Snow Whites” and “Dwarfs.”  Start with your company’s historical distribution of sales rep performance over the last couple of years.  You can also use common sense, based on the experience of seasoned finance and sales managers.  Overlaying that likely distribution onto your company’s current accelerated commission plan should give you a clear idea of how much commission expense you should really expect. 

Accelerated sales commission plans are a great idea, especially in earlier-stage companies where a relatively small number of big deals make a huge difference.  Just don’t find yourself in the embarrassing position of having to explain unpleasant commission expense surprises. 

 

CFO Sales Advisory July 1, 2009                             

 

Accelerated Comp Plans – Sometimes the Rich Should Get Richer

 

Accelerated compensation plans are those where the commission rate increases as the recipient’s performance against quota increases.  Theyare a powerful motivational and sales management tool, especially for earlier-stage companies where a relatively small number of big deals can make a huge difference. 

 

How do accelerated plans work?  Well, in an example where the rep’s target commissions are $100,000 for delivering quota results of $1,000,000, commissions under various performance scenarios might look like this: 

 

                       PRODUCTION               COMMISSION         COMMISSION “RATES”

 

                      $$       % of Quota          $$   % Target Comp        Overall     Incremental

 

                 1,000,000       100%           100,000        100%                  10.0%            10.0%

 

                 2,000,000       200%           250,000        250%                  12.5%            15.0%

 

                 3,000,000       300%           500,000        500%                  16.7%            25.0%

 

There is also typically a “decelerator” on underperformance, so that a rep who only delivered $700,000 (i.e., 70% of quota) might earn only, say, $60,000 (i.e., 60% of target comp). 

 

Accelerated comp plans have these important benefits: 

 

  • They’re a great recruiting tool, because big producers can see big income potential. 

 

  • They’re a great retention tool, for the same reason.

 

  • A sales rep in the middle of a great year is motivated to keep pouring it on because of the accelerated commission rates, rather than coasting for the rest of the year. 

 

  • The extra commission dollars are often less than the additional base salary, benefits, office, travel & entertainment, and other costs incurred by having several average or below-average producers instead of one big producer. 

 

  • Underperforming sales reps “get the message” in their paychecks. 

 

At the same time, accelerated plans need to be crafted carefully because of the larger dollar amounts involved, so plan design flaws can be especially costly.  Also, corporate directors, managers, and administrators need to understand them well enough to ensure that the incentive benefits such plans offer are maximized, and that may take extra effort because the math in these plans is a little more complex. 

 

Finally, communicating accelerated comp plans to the participants is just as important as designing a good plan.  There’s no point to having expensive plans like this unless the plans themselves help to drive the desired behavior in the first place, and that’s only going to happen when the sales people and other participants know exactly how the plans work.  That requires not just communicating, but selling the participants on their value. 

 

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

- About Randall Bolten -

Randy is the CEO of Lucidity, a consulting/coaching practice focused on enterprise finance tasks such as incentive compensation plans, reporting packages, and business models. He is passionate about the importance of presenting financials and other quantitative information in a cogent and effective way. He believes strongly that doing this well is a communication skill, and not a black art practiced by the 'numbers guys."

Mr. Bolten's perspective comes from financial executive assignments and CFO, for publib companies BroadVision and Pheonix Technologies, Corporate Controller at Oracle and financial management positions at Tandem Computers. He has an MBA from Stanford and an AB from Princeton.

Randy is the author of the forthcoming book, Painting with Numbers: Presenting Financials and Other Numbers as if You Were Actually Trying to Say Something, and write posts periodically about the hot numbers-related topics of the moment on his website, www.painting-with-numbers.com

 

 

 

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121 Silicon Valley, Inc.
Suite 200
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ph: ( 650 ) 254 - 1210
fax: ( 650 ) 254 - 1211
alt: (909) 581 - 3562